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On December 8, 2011 Bill 
C-22, An Act respecting the 
mandatory reporting of Internet 
child pornography by persons who 
provide an Internet service, came into 
force. The legislation helps protect children from 
on-line sexual exploitation and applies to suppliers 
of Internet services to the public, including  those 
who provide electronic mail services, Internet 
content hosting  services, and social networking  sites. 
Under the new legislation, those who provide 
Internet services to the public are now required to:
• report tips they receive regarding  Web sites 
where child pornography may be publicly 
available to the Canadian Centre for Child 
Protection; and 
• notify police and safeguard evidence for 21 days 
if they believe that a child pornography offence 
has been committed using  an Internet service 
that they provide.
Failure to comply with the duties set out in this 
legislation constitutes an offence punishable by 
summary conviction with a graduated penalty 
scheme. For individuals (sole proprietorships), the 
maximum penalty is a fine of $1,000 for a first 
offence, $5,000 for a second offence, and for third 
and subsequent offences $10,000 or six months 
imprisonment, or both. For corporations and other 
entities, maximum fines are $10,000 for a first 
offence, $50,000 for a second offence, and $100,000 
for third and subsequent offences.
IN MEMORIAM
On December 1, 2011 37-year-old Bromont Police Officer 
Vincent Roy was killed after being  struck by a vehicle while 
making a traffic stop at approximately 11:30 a.m..
He was completing  the stop and 
returning  the driver's license and 
registration papers to the driver when a truck struck his 
patrol car, and then struck him. He succumbed to his 
injuries at the scene.
Officer Roy had served with the Bromont Police for only 
a few months and had previously served with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. He is survived by his wife and 
two children. 
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“They Are Our Heroes. 
We Shall Not Forget Them.”
inscription on Canada’s 
Police and Peace 
Officers’ Memorial, 
Ottawa
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page 
available at www.odmp.org/canada
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 6-8, 2013
“Staying Connected in a Changing World” 
Mark your calendars. The British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs 
of Police, the Ministry 
of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are 
hosting  the Police Leadership 
2013 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police 
leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership 
topics presented by world renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal 
Analysis
see page 24
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Aggression in the sports world: a social 
psychological perspective. 
Gordon W. Russell.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
BF 575 A3 R867 2008
The art of successful relationships:  the prince or 
the predator.
Georina Ramirez.
New York, NY: Vantage Press, 2010.
HM 1106 R36 2010
Building the learning organization: achieving 
strategic advantage through a commitment to 
learning.
Michael J. Marquardt.
Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Pub., 2011.
HD 58.82 M37 2011
The change book:  change the way you think 
about change.
Tricia Emerson, Mary Stewart.
Alexandria, VA: ASTD Press, c2011.
BF 637 C4 E443 2011
The Constant Contact guide to email marketing.
Eric Groves.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, c2009.
HF 5415.1265 G76 2009
Develop your presentation skills.
Theo Theobald.
London; Philadelphia: Kogan Page, c2011.
HF 5718.22 T455 2011
Exploring research.
Neil J. Salkind.
Boston, MA: Pearson, [2011], c2012.
BF 76.5 S24 2011
Liquor and host liability law in Canada.
Lorne Folick, Michael Libby, Paul Dawson.
Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, c2010.
KE 3734 F65 2010
The manager as coach. [videorecording] 
Supernova Learning Solutions.
Miss issauga, ON: RG Training  Resources 
[distributor], 2011.
1 videodisc (14 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 
CD-ROM (leader's guide)
An emotionally intelligent approach to coaching 
builds effective working  relationships, and helps 
create a culture that supports learning  and 
c o n t i n u o u s i m p r ove m e n t . Th i s p r o g ra m 
demonstrates a simple coaching  framework and 
highlights the skills you need to coach effectively.
HF 5549.5 C53 M36 2011 (Restricted to in-house.) 
D1227
The negotiation of teaching  presence in 
international online contexts.
Tannis Morgan.
Vancouver, BC: Faculty of Graduate Studies, 
University of British Columbia, 2008.
LC 5803 C65 M676 2008
On the edge  [videorecording]: managing  high risk 
situations.
Edge Training  Systems, Inc.; directed by Dan 
Thompson.
Richmond, VA: Edge Training  Systems; Santa Ana, 
CA, c2001.
1 videodisc (18  min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in (DVD) + 
CD-ROM (leader's guide).
Presents realistic scenarios on how to recognize 
warning  signs in potentially volatile situations in the 
workplace and to act to prevent the violence before 
it occurs.
HF 5549.5 E43 O5 2001 (Restricted to in-house.) 
D1190
Volume 11 Issue 6 ! November/December 2011
PAGE 4
The silent language of leaders: how body 
language can help-or hurt-how you lead.
Carol Kinsey Goman.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2011.
BF 637 N66 G664 2011
Strategic planning for public and nonprofit 
organizations: a guide to strengthening  and 
sustaining organizational achievement.
John M. Bryson.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011.
HD 30.28 B79 2011
Success stories from the frontline: intellectual 
disabilities and mental health: an anthology of 
first person stories as submitted by patients and 
their families.
edited by Madeline Hombert; foreword and 
summaries by Robin Friedlander and Tina Donnelly.
Port Coquitlam, BC: Friedlander / Donnelly 
Publishers, 2006.
RC 451.4 M47 S88 2006
Why are we bad at picking  good leaders: a better 
way to evaluate leadership potential.
Jeffrey Cohn, Jay Moran.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011.
HM 1261 C64 2011
Work for all [videorecording]: stop  racism in  the 
workplace = La tête de l'emploi: pour en finir avec 
le racisme au travail.
[Montréal, QC: National Film Board of Canada = 
Office national du film du Canada, c2006.
2 videodiscs (DVD) (ca. 71; 71 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 
in.
French and English versions on separate DVDs in 
one container. Six short films about racism in the 
workplace and interviews with experts.
HF 5549.5 R23 W673 2006 D1205
Yes! 50 scientifically proven ways to be 
persuasive.
Noah J. Goldstein, Steve J. Martin, and Robert B. 
Cialdini.
New York, NY: Free Press, 2010.
HF 5718 G65 2010
TIP PLUS SURVEILLANCE 
PROVIDE GROUNDS FOR 
ARREST
R. v. Whyte, 2011 SCC 49
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !
A CBSA officer assigned! to the 
integrated weapons trafficking 
investigations team received a tip 
from a previously reliable informant. 
The informer said that a black male, 
possibly named “Jay,” would very soon be coming  to 
Windsor from the Toronto area, maybe with 
someone else, for a transaction related to firearms 
and drugs.! The address of an apartment building 
where the transaction was going  to take place was 
also provided. The tip was passed on to a Windsor 
police officer assigned to the Provincial Weapons 
Enforcement Unit. In the officer’s experience, 
Windsor was a place where people came to 
purchase inexpensive firearms because of its 
proximity to Detroit (where firearms were much 
more available).! In the officer’s view, Windsor had 
become a nucleus for illegal trafficking  in 
firearms.!Since drugs, such as cocaine, were cheaper 
in the Toronto area, there was a trade in firearms and 
drugs between Toronto and Windsor. Police set up 
surveillance at the apartment and saw a black Grand 
Prix automobile arrive at about 5:00 a.m.. Two 
people, a black male wearing  a track suit and a 
black female, entered the building.! About half an 
hour later, these same two people left the building, 
returned to their car and headed back to the Toronto 
area.!A check of the licence plate revealed that the 
car was rented. This was! significant to the officer 
because, in his experience, people involved in 
illegal drug  and firearm trafficking  tended to use 
rental vehicles to transport contraband and avoid 
asset forfeiture.
!
Surveillance was broken but Peel police later found 
the car parked in the upper level of a parking  lot 
outside a high rise apartment building  at about 7:45 
a.m..! A few minutes later they saw a black male 
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move the car.! About 15 minutes later, the police 
found the car parked in the apartment building’s 
underground parking  lot. After another 15 minutes, 
two black males and one black female were seen 
coming  out of the apartment building  and go into 
the underground parking  lot, walking  directly to the 
trunk of the car.!One of the men, wearing  a tracksuit, 
was carrying  a shoe box and supporting  its bottom 
with both of his hands.!The two men bent over the 
trunk area and seemed to be moving  things around.! 
The man in the tracksuit pulled off the cover of the 
spare tire. He removed the spare tire, replaced it 
with the shoe box, and then put the cover back on. 
The accused and the female then drove off. The 
vehicle was followed to downtown Toronto where it 
was stopped by a police tactical team. The accused 
and his female companion were arrested, and the 
vehicle was searched. Inside the shoe box were 
three handguns wrapped in a pillowcase.!One of the 
handguns was loaded and another loaded handgun 
was located in the centre console of the 
vehicle.! Police also found a backpack with some 
ammunition. The accused was charged with six 
firearm offences.
!
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the 
accused argued that the evidence should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. The judge 
found that the arresting  officer had the requisite 
subjective belief to make an arrest but lacked the 
objective grounds.!Although the accused conceded 
that the informant was credible, the judge found the 
tip was not compelling. The tip was very vague and 
the opportunity for innocent coincidence was too 
high.! Nor had the tip been independently 
corroborated. The fact that the vehicle was rented 
added nothing  to the grounds for arrest nor did the 
handling  of the shoe box indicate that its contents 
were contraband. While the activity of hiding  the 
shoe box was suspicious, it did not meaningfully 
contribute to the existence of reasonable grounds. 
Considering  the totality of circumstances, the trial 
judge held that the police only had a hunch or 
suspicion that the vehicle contained firearms. The 
police did not have reasonable grounds to arrest the 
occupants of the vehicle and the accused’s arrest 
was unlawful and the search that followed was 
unreasonable. As a result of these ss. 8 and 9 Charter 
breaches, the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) 
and the accused was!acquitted of all!the charges.
!
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Justice Rosenberg, delivering  the opinion of the 
Court, concluded that the trial judge failed to give 
any weight to the accused’s concession of the police 
informer’s credibility. Furthermore, the trial judge 
failed to consider the totality of the information 
available to the arresting  officers in deciding  that the 
police did not have the requisite objective grounds 
to arrest the occupants of the car.!
!
An Informer’s Tip and Reasonable Grounds
!
The test for determining  whether there are 
reasonable grounds based on an informer’s tip 
requires a weighing  of whether the information 
predicting  the commission of a criminal offence was 
compelling, whether the source was credible, and 
whether the information was corroborated by police 
investigation. These factors do not form separate 
tests, but rather must be viewed on the “totality of 
the circumstances”. Weaknesses in one factor may 
be compensated by strengths in the other two.
!
In this case, the accused conceded that the 
informant was credible. The informer was not just 
credible in the general sense because he had 
provided reliable information to the police in the 
past, but he had provided information in the past 
concerning  firearms and drugs, as in this case. The 
informer’s credibility was not just simply a factor to 
consider but it could compensate for weaknesses in 
the other two areas, especially whether the 
information predicting  the commission of the 
offence was compelling.!
!
As for the police surveillance, the trial judge had 
compartmentalized the information obtained from it 
and unreasonably discounted its value.!Here, police 
surveillance confirmed elements of the tip including 
the attendance at the address provided by the 
reliable informer. Plus, driving  a rental car all the 
way from Toronto for a 30 minute stay was highly 
suspicious and provided some confirmation that the 
people were in Windsor for a criminal purpose.! 
“These facts, on their  own, may not have been 
sufficient to provide the police with reasonable 
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grounds for arrest, and the police themselves 
recognized this fact,” said Justice Rosenberg. 
“However, these facts were beginning  to build a 
compelling  picture of criminal activity as predicted 
by the informer.” As to the significance that the car 
was rented, Justice Rosenberg added:
!
First, whether or not there were reasonable 
grounds did not stand or fall on the opinion of 
officers as to the weight to be attached to 
mundane items that could be found in any 
vehicle, rented or otherwise.!The police in this 
case were relying  on a tip from an informer who 
had proved reliable in the past …! Second, the 
inference to be drawn from the use of a rented 
car was simply one piece of information to be 
considered along  with all the other information.! 
It was entitled to some weight based on the 
officers’ training and experience.!On its own, it 
could not provide objective grounds for a 
search. However, it could not be wholly 
discounted, since there was no evidence to 
undermine the value of the officers’ training and 
experience …! Finally, the fact of the use of a 
rented car had to be placed into context.!The car 
had been rented in the Toronto area, which 
confirmed the aspect of the tip that the suspects 
were coming from Toronto. [para. 26]
Even though the police lost sight of the vehicle for a 
brief period and were unable to verify that the 
people who travelled to Windsor were the same 
ones who returned to the car with the shoe box, the 
surveillance was still of value. “In Windsor, a black 
male wearing  a track suit and a black female were 
associated with the vehicle,” said Justice 
Rosenberg.!“In Toronto, a black male wearing  a track 
suit and a black female were again associated with 
the vehicle, along  with another black male.! The 
police could not say for certain that they were the 
same people associated with the vehicle in Windsor, 
but it was an interesting coincidence.” 
Furthermore, the highly suspicious handling  of the 
shoe box was, even on its own, powerful evidence 
that the vehicle was being  used to carry 
contraband.!Although it was not possible to say that 
the shoe box contained firearms as opposed to drugs 
or some other contraband by simply looking  at how 
it was handled, it could nonetheless meaningfully 
contribute to the existence of reasonable grounds 
(contrary to the trial judge’s conclusion). The 
surveillance was not to stand on its own, but 
independently confirmed the informer’s tip. In 
conclusion, Rosenberg held:
!
To summarize, by the time the police decided to 
stop the vehicle they had the following 
information to confirm the tip from the reliable 
informer:
• The vehicle arrived at the Windsor 
apartment building  address as predicted in 
the tip;
• Windsor was known to be a location for 
firearm/drug transactions;
• The suspects were driving a rental vehicle;
• The suspects arrived in Windsor at 5:00 
a.m. and remained for only 30 minutes;
• A black man wearing a track suit and a 
black woman were involved in both 
Windsor and Peel;
• The vehicle was parked in Peel for only 30 
minutes before the occupants of the car 
were on the move again, this time with a 
shoebox secreted in the space where the 
spare tire had been.
!
Taken together, this information was sufficient to 
confirm the tip from the reliable informer and 
provide the police with the necessary objectively 
reasonable grounds to arrest the occupants of 
the vehicle and search the vehicle.! …
!
In this case, the sequence of events, from the 30 
minute stay at the specified address in Windsor 
to the secreting of the shoe box after the 30 
minute stay in Peel, sufficiently conformed to the 
anticipated pattern to remove the possibility of 
innocent coincidence.! This sequence of events 
had to be measured against the knowledge and 
experience that the police officers brought to the 
investigation in informing the inferences to be 
drawn from the observations.!  That experience 
included knowledge of the trafficking  in firearms 
in the Windsor area and the use of rental cars in 
illegal trafficking of drugs and firearms.!  [paras. 
29-31]
!
The Ontario Court of Appeal found the police had 
reasonable grounds, subjective and objective, to 
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believe that the occupants of the vehicle were in 
possession of illegal firearms. The arrest of the 
occupants was lawful, the search that followed was 
incidental to arrest, and there were no Charter 
breaches. The evidence was admissible. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, several weapons convictions 
were entered, and the matter was remitted back to 
the trial judge for sentencing.! !He was subsequently 
sentenced to!6 " years imprisonment less credit for 
4 years of pre-trial custody. He was also given a 
lifetime firearms!prohibition, ordered to provide his 
DNA,!and the seized weapons were!forfeited.
!
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a short oral judgment, Justice Deschamps 
delivered the unanimous opinion and concluded 
that the Ontario Court of Appeal did not err. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
UNLAWFUL ARREST LEADS TO 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH
R.!v.!Smith,!2011 ONCA 748!
A police officer received general and 
generic information from an untested 
informant that the accused was in 
possession of cocaine and was 
selling  it in the Hamilton area.! The 
informant further stated that the accused kept the 
cocaine inside his vehicle, a black Nissan with black 
rims, and at his house along  with a firearm. 
However, the location of where the firearm was kept 
was unknown.!The informant had a lengthy criminal 
record, was deeply entrenched in the criminal 
culture, and appeared to be motivated by the hope 
of consideration for his own outstanding  charges at 
the time. There was no indication of the source of 
the informant’s information and there were no 
specific details of any drug  transaction. The police 
confirmed the information about the motor vehicle 
the accused drove and set up surveillance on his 
residence. He was seen leaving  the residence and 
drove to a townhouse complex where a male 
walked to the accused’s car and got in.! The car 
proceeded to move slowly for about 10 metres and 
stopped, at which point the unknown male got out 
and walked towards the complex.! This male was 
unknown, was not detained, and was not seen 
carrying  anything  in or from the car.! Because the 
windows were tinted no observations could be made 
of any activity and nothing was overheard.
The accused drove away, parked his vehicle, and 
entered a bank. When he returned to his car he was 
arrested, advised of his rights, and indicated he 
wanted to speak to counsel. However, instead of 
holding  off the questioning, a police officer 
interviewed the accused as to the existence of a 
firearm and drugs at his residence. The accused and 
his car were searched and police found cocaine in 
his car, and cash and cell phones on his person. 
Using  the evidence found from the post arrest 
searches as well as the accused’s statements, the 
police applied for and obtained a tele-warrant to 
search his house. Cocaine, other drug  paraphernalia, 
cash, a firearm, and ammunition were subsequently 
located.
The trial judge in the Ontario Court of Justice found 
the accused’s arrest unlawful and arbitrary. The tip 
was from an untested informant and lacked any 
information as to the source of the tipster’s alleged 
assertion that the accused was a drug  dealer. This, 
combined with a very brief observation of the 
accused meeting  with an unidentified person in the 
accused’s vehicle, did not provide reasonable 
grounds for the arrest. “I find that the arrest fell short 
of passing  the objective requirement insofar as 
reasonable grounds are concerned,” said the 
judge.! “Combining  the vague information from a 
previously untested informant with the observation 
of one event which was also reasonably capable of 
innocent explanation is insufficient to meet the 
standard for objective belief of the commission of 
the offence subjectively believed by the officers.!This 
information and observation certainly justified 
further observation and! investigation but not an 
arrest.” The judge also found a s. 10(b) Charter 
breach (right to counsel) at the time of arrest, which 
was conceded by Crown, to be serious. The 
evidence following  the arrest was excluded and 
could not be used to support the search warrant of 
the accused’s home. He was acquitted. 
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The Crown’s challenge to the accused’s acquittal 
before the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed. 
“We agree with the trial judge’s characterization of 
the tip provided by the informant and the 
surveillance observations made by the police 
officer,” said the Court. “The very short duration of 
the meeting  between the [accused] and the 
unidentified person in the [accused's] car, the only 
fact relied on by the police to support the inference 
that the meeting  involved a drug  transaction, was, 
on any reasonable view, a neutral fact. It follows 
from the finding  that the arrest was illegal that the 
subsequent search of the [accused] and his vehicle 
were unconstitutional.! The search of the residence 
based upon a warrant founded on information 
flowing  from the unconstitutional arrest and searches 
of the [accused] and the vehicle was also 
unconstitutional.”! These Charter  breaches were 
compounded by the serious breach of the accused’s 
right to counsel.! The trial judge did not err in 
excluding the evidence under s. 24(2). 
Editor’s note: Facts of this case taken from 2009 
ONCJ 641.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
PERSONAL DISCOMFORT DOES 
NOT NECESSARILY AMOUNT TO 
EXCESSIVE FORCE
Richmond v. Her Majesty the Queen,
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 251
The plaintiff, a 38-year-old man 
suffering  from psychiatric challenges, 
resided in a home owned by his 
mother. One day, while in an agitated 
state due to perceived inattention by 
his parents, he made a number of threatening 
telephone calls to his father. The plaintiff’s father 
contacted the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP). This 
conversation prompted officers to attend the 
plaintiff’s home and knock on door. There was no 
response but officers could hear music playing 
inside the residence. Although the telephone was 
picked up when police called, no conversation 
ensued as the phone was hung  up by the resident of 
the home. The police set up a perimeter around the 
home and contacted the plaintiff’s family physician. 
Based on the doctor’s prior observations of the 
plaintiff and the police description of his current 
behaviour, the doctor signed a Form 1 under 
Ontario’s Mental Health Act for the plaintiff’s 
apprehension, which was communicated to the 
officers on scene. Police breached the front door, 
which had been barricaded by a motorcycle and a 
box of tools. Upon entry, the officers observed the 
plaintiff standing  in the foyer. He was told to lie 
down and did so. A large knife was seen near him 
but he made no aggressive moves. He was 
handcuffed and taken to the hospital where the 
attending  physician referred him to a mental health 
centre.
The plaintiff brought an action in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice against the OPP alleging  it 
had used excessive force in apprehending  him, 
which he felt was illegal. But the judge dismissed his 
claim, finding  the OPP did not use excessive force in 
apprehending  the plaintiff. “While [he] may have 
experienced some personal discomfort, as a result of 
the apprehension,” said the judge, “that discomfort 
does not equate to a finding  that the police used 
exces s ive fo rce .” H i s apprehens ion and 
transportation to the hospital was lawful. It was 
justified under the legislative authority of the Mental 
Health Act.
The plaintiff’s appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
was dismissed. The Court found the trial judge’s 
decision turned on the findings of fact and no error 
was made. The plaintiff then sought leave to appeal 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. Chief Justice 
McLachlin and Justices Binnie and Deschamps, 
however, dismissed the plaintiff’s application 
without reasons. The decision of the Ontario 
Superior Court judge therefore stands. 
Editor’s note: Facts of this case taken from 2010 
ONSC 2738.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
www.10-8.ca
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2010 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2011 Statistics Canada 
released its “Police reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2010” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• there were 2,095,921 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2010; this 
represents 77,039 fewer crimes reported when 
compared to 2009 data.
• the total crime rate dropped -5%. This included a 
violent crime rate drop of -3% and a property 
crime rate drop of -6%.
YK
T-171.2
V-188.1
NV-164.7
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-148.2 
V-153.9
NV-145.9
AB
T-97.9
V-98.1
NV-97.8
BC
T-102.4
V-102.1
NV-102.5
QC
T-76.9
V-76.5
NV-77.0
ON
T-65.0
V-77.7
NV-60.2
MB
T-127.8
V-162.3
NV-114.5
NWT
T-340.2
V-325.2
NV-345.9
NU
T-345.7
V-505.7
NV-284.2
NB
T-69.0
V-68.4
NV-69.2
NF
T-80.2
V-70.2
NV-84.1
NS
T-83.5
V-84.5
NV-83.1
PEI
T-65.5
V-44.0
NV-73.8
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2008 to 2009
SK 628 6,566 +3%
PEI 511 727 +10%
NF 416 2,119 +22%
AB 399 14,865 -14%
NS 363 3,426 +8%
BC 355 16,067 -8%
NB 350 2,628 +8%
MB 246 3,040 -18%
QC 208 16,424 -1%
ON 130 17,191 -7%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violnet CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2009”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 21, 2011.
Volume 11 Issue 6 ! November/December 2011
PAGE 10
YK
20,965
-10%
MB
10,187
-3%
SK
12,578
-2%
AB
8,084
-6%
BC
8,404
-6%
NWT
46,400
+11%
QC
4,770
-5%
ON
4,458
-5%
NF
6,725
+3%
NU
39,223
+4%
PEI
6,206
-1%
NB
5,496
-2%
NS
6,980
+1%
Police-Reported Crime Rates 
per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 536,151
Mischief 339,831
Break and Enter 196,881
Administration of Justice Violations 176,560
Assault-level 1 173,843
Disturb the Peace 117,903
Motor Vehicle Theft 92,683
Fraud 88,491
Impaired Driving 84,397
Uttering Threats 75,927
Homicide
There were 554 homicides reported, 56 less than the 
previous year. Ontario had the most homicides at 
189 (a +5% increase), followed by Quebec (84) 
British Columbia (83), and Alberta (77). Prince 
Edward Island reported no homicides while the 
Yukon and the Northwest Territories each reported 
only one. As for provincial or territorial homicide 
rates, Nunavut had the highest (18.1 per 100,000 
popula t ion) fo l lowed by Mani toba (3.6 ) , 
Saskatchewan (3.3), Yukon (2.9), Northwest 
Territories (2.3) and Nova Scotia (2.2). As for Census 
Metropolitan Areas (CMA), Thunder Bay, ON had the 
highest homicide rate at 4.2. The Canadian 
homicide rate was 1.6.
Canada
6,145
-5%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Thunder Bay, ON 4.2 Greater Sudbury, ON 2.4
Regina, SK 3.7 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 2.3
Saskatoon, SK 3.7 Moncton, NB 2.2
Winnipeg, MB 2.8 Saint John, NB 1.9
Edmonton,  AB 2.7 Kingston, ON 1.9
Halifax, NS 2.7 London, ON 1.8
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Robbery
In 2010 there were 30,405 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 89 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, and Ontario. 
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA 
rate of robbery in Canada (258), 
-13% lower than its 2009 rate. Saguenay, 
QC had the lowest rate (19) for the second 
year in a row. Three CMAs reported jumps of 
+20% or more in robbery rates; St. John’s, NF 
(+53%), Brantford, ON (+26%), and Kitchener-
Cambridge-Waterloo, ON (+20%).
• five CMAs reported declines in robberies of -30% 
or more; Saint John, NB (-50%), Kingston, ON 
(-50%), Trois-Rivieres, QC (-31%), Abbotsford-
Mission, BC (-30%), and Moncton, NB (-30%).  
Break and Enter
In 2010 there were 196,881 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 577 break-ins per 
100,000 people. Nunavut had the 
highest break- in rate (2,035 ) 
followed by the Northwest Territories 
(1,629) and Saskatchewan (938). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2009 to 2010
MB 176 2,177 -11%
SK 121 1,263 0
BC 108 4,878 -7%
ON 88 11,567 -6%
AB 86 3,213 -15%
QC 81 6,442 -6%
NWT 55 24 +84%
NS 52 486 -17%
YK 49 17 +84%
NU 42 14 -41%
NF 31 160 +37%
NB 19 142 -29%
PEI 15 22 +15%
CANADA 89 30,405 -7%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 258 Montreal, QC 142
Saskatoon, SK 199 Toronto, ON 128
Regina, SK 196 Edmonton, AB 118
Thunder Bay, ON 149 Calgary, AB 109
Vancouver, BC 147 Halifax, NS 95
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2009 to 2010
NU 2,035 676 +3%
NWT 1,629 713 -2%
SK 938 9,806 -1%
MB 819 10,116 -5%
YK 718 248 -6%
BC 692 31,346 -8%
QC 680 53,733 -9%
NF 667 3,399 +17%
AB 606 22,533 -5%
NS 558 5,259 +3%
PEI 515 732 +1%
NB 483 3,633 +4%
ON 414 54,687 -5%
CANADA 577 196,881 -6%
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• break-ins accounted for about 15% of all 
property crimes.
• 61% of break-ins were to a residence, 28% to a 
business location, and 11% to other locations, 
such as a shed or detached garage.
• residential break-ins dropped -4% while business 
break-ins declined -13%.
• from 2000 to 2010, the break-in rate dropped by 
-40%.
• among  CMAs, Saskatoon, SK reported the highest 
break-in rate (845) while Toronto reported the 
lowest (307) for a second straight year. 
Peterborough, ON (+27%), Saguenay, QC 
(+21%), and Moncton, NB (+13%) all reported 
double digit increases in the break-in rate, while 
Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-37%), Victoria, BC 
(-29%), Saint John, NB (-24%), Sherbrooke, QC 
(-19%), Kingston, ON (-17%), Regina, SK 
(-16%), Thunder Bay, ON (-16%), Vancouver, BC 
(-13%), Windsor, ON (-11%), Guelph, ON 
(-10%), and Ottawa, ON (-10%) all had double 
digit drops.
Drugs
In 2010 there were 108,529 
drug-related offences coming  to 
the attention of police. These 
offences included possession, 
t raf f icking, product ion or 
distribution. 
• p o s s e s s i o n o f f e n c e s 
accounted for 73,588 of 
these crimes - cannabis 
(56,870); cocaine (7,256); 
and other drugs (9,462). Other drugs include 
heroin, crystal meth, and ecstasy;
• the trafficking, production, 
and distribution offences 
totaled 32,974 - cannabis 
( 1 6 , 4 0 4 ) ; c o c a i n e 
(10,027); and other drugs 
(6,543).
• British Columbia had the highest drug  related 
offence rates of all 10 provinces for cannabis and 
cocaine. Newfoundland was tops for other drugs.
• The territories continue to have some of the 
highest drug-related crime rates in Canada.
• Overall, drug  offences were up in 2010 (+10%) 
from 2009, mainly due to a +13% rise in 
cannabis offences.
Top Ten CMA Break-in Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Trois-Rivieres, QC 875 Vancouver, BC 787
Regina, SK 856 Brantford, ON 775
Saskatoon, SK 856 St. John’s, NF 766
Winnipeg, MB 810 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 727
Kelowna, BC 796 Gatineau, QC 713
10%
77%
13%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Possession Offences       
by Drug Type
30%
50%
20%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Trafficking, Production  & 
Distribution Offences     
by Drug Type
Drug-related Crime Rates by Province
per 100,000 population
Province Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
BC 421 106 64
SK 252 63 51
NS 251 34 46
QC 208 25 54
NF 205 38 67
NB 199 30 55
AB 195 76 37
ON 165 38 42
MB 157 58 30
PEI 108 22 41
Territory Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
NWT 1,261 293 114
NU 1,039 15 18
YK 327 130 64
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Motor Vehicle Theft
In 2010 there were 92,683 motor vehicle thefts 
reported to police, down (-15%) from 107,992 in 
2009 and down -48% from a decade ago.
• on average there were 254 vehicles stolen per 
day in Canada in 2010.
• the motor vehicle theft rate was 272 per 100,000 
population.
• the most vehicles reported stolen was in Quebec 
(24,410) while the Yukon had the fewest vehicles 
stolen (160).
• eight CMAs reported declines in motor vehicle 
thefts of -25% or more; Trois Rivieres, QC 
(-41%), Guelph, ON (-37%), Brantford, ON 
(-31%), Peterborough, ON (-31%), Barrie, ON 
(-30%), Ottawa, ON (-30%), Moncton, NB 
(-27%), Victoria, BC (-27%), Edmonton, AB 
(-26%), and Kelowna, BC (-25%).  
Police Assaults
Assaulting  a police officer rose (+45%) from 2009 to 
2010. In 2010 there were 17,377 assault police 
officer offences compared to 11,837 the previous 
year. This increase may be attributable to new 
offences of assault with weapon/CBH to a peace 
officer and aggravated assault against peace officer 
which were recently added to the Criminal Code. 
These offences would have previously been reported 
under the general assault with weapon/CBH or 
aggravated assault provisions in the Criminal Code.
Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts
Province/
Territory
Rate Motor Vehicle 
Thefts
Rate change 
2009 to 2010
NU 614 204 +2%
NWT 507 222 -5%
SK 477 4,988 -8%
YK 463 160 +18%
MB 453 5,596 -15%
AB 411 15,298 -18%
BC 352 15,957 -20%
QC 309 24,410 -11%
ON 171 22,611 -18%
NB 165 1,239 -4%
NS 136 1,282 -3%
NF 118 603 +30%
PEI 79 113 -30%
CANADA 272 92,683 -15%
Top Ten CMA Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Regina, SK 562 Saskatoon, SK 471
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 553 Edmonton, AB 446
Winnipeg, MB 503 Vancouver, BC 370
Kelowna, BC 494 Calgary, AB 369
Brantford, ON 474 Montreal, QC 361
CANADA’S TOP 10 
STOLEN VEHICLES
2010
1. 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
2. 1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
3. 2002 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD
4. 2004 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD
5. 2005 Acura RSX Type S 2-door
6. 1997 Acura Integra 2-door
7. 2000 Audi S4 Quattro 4-door AWD
8. 2003 Hummer H2 4-door AWD
9. 2006 Acura RSX Type S 2-door
10. 2004 Hummer H2 4-door AWD
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, December 16, 2010
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EXPLANATION OF 2.5 HOUR 
SEARCH DELAY AFTER ARREST 
NOT REQUIRED
R. v. Asp, 2011 BCCA 433
!
The accused left a hotel in the middle 
of the night in a manner that a private 
security guard at the hotel found 
suspicious.!He had left the hotel with 
a female and did not inform the front 
desk. The security guard followed the vehicle driven 
by the accused and called 911. During  the 911 call 
the guard started to scream, reported his location, 
and then the phone went dead.!The police attended 
and saw two males involved in an altercation. The 
accused’s vehicle rolled forward and struck a pole. 
The collision dislodged the lid from the top of the 
white box in the backseat, exposing  plastic bags of 
marijuana in the box.! The accused and his female 
companion were initially arrested for possessing  a 
controlled substance and then re-arrested for 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. The vehicle 
was towed to the police station where it was 
searched without a warrant about 2.5 hours after the 
arrest. A total of 13.59 kgs. of marihuana, found in 
54 zip-lock bags, was seized. Although the police 
never investigated, arrested or charged the accused 
with theft from the hotel, he was charged with 
possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court it was 
agreed that the police could have obtained a search 
warrant had they applied for one. There were no 
exigent circumstances such that evidence in the 
vehicle might have been lost or destroyed had they 
waited and applied for a warrant. Nor was there any 
risk evidence would have been removed from the 
vehicle while awaiting  a warrant.! It was further 
agreed that the police searched the vehicle as part of 
a drug  investigation and they did not seek the 
accused’s consent. The trial judge concluded that the 
police did not breach the accused’s s. 8  Charter 
rights by searching  his vehicle and seizing  the 
marijuana. She found that both the plain view 
doctrine and the common-law power of search 
incidental to arrest applied.! “Neither the initial 
seizure of the marijuana from the [accused’s] vehicle 
seen by the police in plain view, nor the subsequent 
search of the vehicle and the further seizure of 
marijuana in the context of a search incidental to 
arrest, constituted a violation of [the accused’s] s. 8 
Charter rights,” said the judge. A conviction 
followed. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, contending  that the 
warrantless search of his vehicle and the seizure of 
the drugs were unreasonable under s. 8 and that the 
drugs should have been excluded under s. 24(2).! In 
his view, the facts neither supported the application 
of the plain view doctrine or the power of search 
incidental to arrest.! He submitted, among  other 
grounds, that the search of his vehicle did not fall 
within the common-law power of search incidental 
to arrest because the Crown failed to establish how 
much time passed between the arrest and the search 
and did not provide an explanation for any delay. In 
this case, the accused suggested that the distance 
from the place of arrest to the police station as well 
as how much time passed from the arrest until the 
vehicle was searched were not known. !
Search Incidental to Arrest
Justice Frankel, authoring  the unanimous opinion for 
the Court, first cited a useful summary of the leading 
authority on the application of the common-law 
power of searching  vehicles incidental to arrest from 
R. v. Majedi,2009 BCCA 276:
• Officers undertaking a search incidental to arrest 
do not require reasonable and probable grounds; 
a lawful arrest provides that foundation and the 
right to search derives from it;
• The right to search does not arise out of a reduced 
expectation of privacy of the arrested person, but 
flows out of the need for the authorities to gain 
control of the situation and the need to obtain 
information;
• A legally unauthorized search to make an 
inventory is not a valid search incidental to arrest;
• The three main purposes of a search incidental to 
arrest are:!one, to ensure the safety of the police 
and the public; two, to protect evidence; three, to 
discover evidence;
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• The categories of legitimate purposes are not 
closed:! while the police have considerable 
leeway, a valid purpose is required that must be 
“truly incidental” to the arrest;
• If the justification for the search is to find 
evidence, there must be a reasonable prospect the 
evidence will relate to the offence for which the 
person has been arrested;
• The police undertaking  a search incidental to 
arrest subjectively must have a valid purpose in 
mind, the reasonableness of which must be 
considered objectively. [reference paras. omitted]
As for the delay between the arrests and the search, 
Justice Frankel found the search took place within a 
reasonable amount of time. Although there will be 
some cases in which the Crown will be required to 
provide a reasonable explanation for a delay 
between an arrest and a search, this was not such a 
case.! Here, the police arrived at the scene of the 
altercation at 3:00 a.m. The accused was arrested 
shortly after that and the date and time stamp on 
photographs that were tendered as an exhibit at trial 
established that the search took place approximately 
two and one-half hours after the accused was taken 
into custody and his vehicle towed to the police 
station. “In my view, that period is prima facie 
reasonable,” said Justice Frankel. “There is no delay 
that the Crown needs to explain.”
Since the drugs were seized by the police in the 
lawful exercise of the power of search incidental to 
arrest, it was not necessary to address the 
application of the plain view doctrine. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
SAFETY OR EVIDENCE 
CONCERNS MAY JUSTIFY 
WAIVING KNOCK & ANNOUNCE
R. v. Sexton, 2011 NBCA 97
The police swore an Information to 
Obtain (ITO) a warrant under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) for a search of the accused’s 
apartment. In the month leading  up 
to the execution of the warrant, police officers had 
received information from various sources that the 
accused was trafficking  in cocaine and other drugs. 
The ITO included information from a source that he 
had been at the apartment within the last 24 hours 
and had seen the accused in possession of what was 
believed to be cocaine. As part of! their plan to 
obtain and execute the search warrant, the police 
were going  to utilize a “hard” (“no-knock” or 
“dynamic”) entry. They chose a hard entry because 
they were concerned about:
1. officer safety: (the accused’s criminal past 
included convictions for weapons and drug 
related offences and an outstanding  charge of 
assaulting  a police officer. CPIC also contained 
two cautions about the accused, (i) violence 
and (ii) armed and dangerous);! 
2. the safety of those in neighbouring  apartments: 
(if violence arose in the course of entering  the 
apartment or conducting the search); and 
3. the preservation of evidence: (cocaine dissolves 
easily and is therefore easily disposed of. 
Without the element of surprise, persons inside 
the apartment could!the pour cocaine down the 
sink or a toilet bowl.)
The police confirmed that the accused was present 
in the apartment when two uniformed police officers 
knocked on the door under the ruse that they were 
looking  to speak to his brother on a different matter. 
After they left, a team of four police officers, each 
armed with tactical rifles, wearing  helmets, goggles, 
balaclavas, and dressed in emergency response 
uniforms with the word "POLICE" inscribed on the 
front and back of their vests, entered the apartment 
without notice by using  a battering  ram. The accused 
was arrested, the search warrant executed, and 
several charges were laid under the Criminal Code 
and the CDSA, which included possession of 
cocaine, ecstasy, hashish, LSD, a sawed-off shotgun, 
an operational replica AK-47 assault rifle, three 9 
mm handguns and one .22 calibre handgun.
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the judge 
concluded that the hard entry was unreasonable in 
the circumstances for three reasons: 
Volume 11 Issue 6 ! November/December 2011
PAGE 16
(1) the reliance by the police on the CPIC cautions 
was “absolutely comical”, 
(2) the police should have known the accused was 
not a threat because he was perfectly 
reasonable in his interactions with the two 
uniformed police officers enquiring  about his 
brother, and 
(3) the police officers wore balaclavas. The judge 
found “there was no justification whatsoever” 
for their use, citing  “an innate distaste and 
dislike for anonymity.” 
Since the means employed to execute the warrant 
violated the accused’s s. 8  Charter  rights, the judge 
excluded the evidence. He was acquitted on all 
charges. 
The Crown appealed the judge’s findings that the 
search was conducted in an unreasonable fashion 
before the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. The 
Court first summarized the common law “knock and 
announce” rule:
In the ordinary course of events, police officers 
are required to make an announcement before 
forcing entry into a dwelling house. This is 
accomplished by giving  “(i) notice of presence 
by knocking  or ringing the doorbell; (ii) notice of 
authority, by identifying themselves as law 
enforcement officers and (iii) notice of purpose, 
by stating the lawful reason for entry.” [reference 
omitted, at para 23]
The police may, however, depart from “the knock 
and announce rule in circumstances where they 
have reasonable grounds to be concerned about 
their safety, the safety of others, or the destruction of 
evidence.” But when challenged, the police must 
explain why they thought it was necessary to do so. 
In determining  whether the police had reasonable 
grounds for concern to justify use of an 
unannounced, forced entry, their decision must be 
judged by what was or should reasonably have been 
known to them at the time, not in light of how things 
turned out to be. After the fact assessments are unfair 
and inappropriate where officers must exercise 
discretion and judgment in difficult and fluid 
situations. As well, the police must be allowed a 
certain amount of latitude in the manner in which 
they decide to enter premises. They cannot be 
expected to measure in advance, with nuanced 
precision, the amount of force the situation will 
require. 
In this case, Justice Bell found the search to be 
reasonable in the circumstances, noting  a number of 
factors:
! There are two practical reasons why police 
must take the search of someone else's 
residence very seriously. First, it is highly likely 
that suspects will know the layout of the place 
being  searched much better than the police. 
They will know potential means of escape and 
potential sources of weapons. Second, the 
person whose residence is being  searched will, 
in most cases, have a better knowledge of who 
is present in the premises. Unknown layout and 
unknown occupancy provide a practical 
advantage to the person whose residence is 
being  searched in the event that person wishes 
to destroy evidence or obstruct, evade, or cause 
injury to police.
! Police knew the accused had a criminal record 
for weapons and drug  offences and was 
awaiting  trial on a charge of assaulting  a peace 
officer. Information appearing  in CPIC 
constitutes a source of information which is 
used by virtually every police officer in Canada 
and whose information is communicated to, 
and relied upon, by courts throughout the 
country on a daily basis. Not only should 
police rely upon CPIC, they would no doubt be 
negligent and subject to disciplinary action if 
they choose to disregard it. The fact the CPIC 
cautions did not constitute a criminal record 
did not render them unreliable. 
! The uneventful visit at the accused’s door 
changed nothing  about his criminal record, 
outstanding  charges, or the CPIC cautions. Nor 
did it change anything  about the police 
knowledge or lack thereof about the layout of 
the premises or the occupants of the apartment. 
The accused’s response to a search of his 
premises for cocaine and other drugs might not 
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be the same as when responding  to police 
questions concerning  an unrelated matter. The 
courts are not to be "Monday morning 
quarterbacks" on these sorts of questions. The 
visit at the door was, at best, a neutral event 
and the police continued to reasonably hold 
the view that a hard entry was required. 
! Courts should not attempt to micromanage the 
police choice of equipment. Here, the police 
said they wore the masks to protect them from 
the possibility of shattering  glass or flames. 
Further, the police were not operating 
anonymously. Their vests contained the 
inscription “POLICE” on the front and back and 
officers removed their balaclavas and helmets 
within a few minutes after the apartment was 
secured.
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SAFETY CONCERNS NOT 
OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED: 
ENTRY UNLAWFUL 
R. v. Larson, 2011 BCCA 454
Police were dispatched at about 
10:45 a.m. to investigate a report that 
a distraught man had discharged 
some pepper-spray inside a vehicle 
and was now swimming  in a lake. 
When officers arrived the accused was swimming 
about 30 metres offshore in a rocky area not suited 
for swimming.!Officers persuaded him to come to 
shore. He was frantic and said he was being  pursued 
by people who were out to get him and were 
shooting  at him. Suspecting  he was in a state of 
drug-induced paranoia and acting  in a manner that 
was likely to endanger his own safety, the accused 
was apprehended under s.!28  of British Columbia’s 
Mental Health Act. During  the 30-minute drive to 
the hospital, the accused said two men had invaded 
his home, and that people were trying  to harm 
him.!He pointed to people in the vicinity, alleging 
that they were from the same group as the people 
who had gone to his home.! He also said that people 
were shooting  at him from passing  vehicles. He 
asked police to drive quickly, not to stop at 
stoplights, and ducked down when they passed 
other vehicles.! He said that he was scared to go 
back to his house and would not do so until it was 
safe.
Police decided to go to the accused’s home to make 
sure there were no intruders.!They also had a prior 
suspicion that he had a marihuana grow operation 
in it. An officer arrived at 11:50 a.m. and, while 
waiting  for backup, spoke to a neighbour who said 
he was not aware of any incident having  occurred at 
the accused's house.! There was no sign of forced 
entry at the house and police could not see any 
indications that a home invasion had occurred (or 
was in progress). Nor was any activity or motion in 
the house detected. When back-up arrived at 12:25 
p.m. officers found a sliding  glass door unlocked 
and entered the house, announcing  “Police” several 
times.!There was no answer, no unusual sounds, and 
no signs of movement in the house.!Police searched 
all three levels of the house.!They found no one in 
the dwelling, and saw no evidence of forced entry, 
no blood stains, no furniture or other articles that 
appeared disturbed, and no other signs of a 
struggle.!After locating  a marihuana grow operation 
in the basement on the initial search, the police 
obtained a warrant, and conducted a second search 
pursuant to it.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officers testified that their purpose in going  to the 
accused’s home was solely to determine whether 
there was evidence of an assault and whether 
anyone who may have perpetrated the assault 
remained on the premises. The judge found that the 
warrantless entry into the home was lawful under 
the common law police power to protect public and 
individual safety.! Not only did the police have a 
subjective belief that there might have been a home 
invasion and the perpetrators might still be inside, 
the belief was objectively reasonable. “The police 
officers clearly had a subjective, reasonable belief 
that they should enter the residence in order to 
investigate the claim of a home invasion and 
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whether or not it had occurred; furthermore, to 
determine if an assault had occurred, to determine if 
anyone was in the house, and to determine if there 
was any public safety concern and concerns that 
related to the safety of [the accused],” said the 
judge. “From an objective perspective, the 
perspective of a reasonable informed person, I find 
that the standard has … been met in this case.!  ... I 
make that finding  in spite of the obvious behaviour 
of [the accused] and his claims that people were 
shooting  at him, when clearly that was not accurate 
or correct.!  But nevertheless, taking  into account the 
constellation of evidence that was presented to the 
police at the scene here, I find their actions were 
reasonable.” Since the warrantless search was 
lawful, the subsequent warrant, issued on the basis 
of evidence uncovered during  the initial warrantless 
search, was valid. The accused was convicted of 
producing  marihuana and he was sentenced to a 12-
month conditional sentence. 
The accused challenged the trial judge’s ruling  to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing  the police 
had no common law or statutory duty to investigate 
his allegation that he had been the victim of a home 
invasion.!He asserted that the police ought to have 
known that his allegations were the product of a 
paranoid delusion and were baseless because of his 
condition when apprehended. Since the warrantless 
search was unlawful, the search warrant based on 
the information obtained from this initial search 
rendered the warrant invalid and unreasonable 
under s. 8. In the accused’s view, the evidence 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2). The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the police 
had reason to believe that entry without a warrant 
was necessary to protect the 
lives or safety of the occupants 
and that there was no effective 
alternative to the warrantless 
entry. 
In this case, the accused did 
not consent to the search of his 
home. “Without consent, a 
warrantless search is prima 
facie an unreasonable one,” 
said Justice Groberman, writing 
the opinion for the two member majority. “Where a 
warrantless search is conducted in a person’s 
residence, the Crown has the onus of showing  that 
the search was lawful.” In deciding  whether the 
police conduct in this case was lawful, the Court 
needed to determine the following:
1. whether the police conduct fell within the 
general scope of any duty imposed by statute 
or recognized at common law, and
2. whether the police power that was used was 
justified.
The Initial Investigation 
Justice Groberman found that the police had the 
duty to investigate the accused’s report of a home 
invasion. He stated:
The accused was obviously delusional at the 
time of his apprehension, and the police were, 
no doubt, alive to the possibility that his report 
of a home invasion was not based in reality.! 
That said, it was entirely possible that [the 
accused] had been the victim of a home 
invasion as he reported.! Indeed, his paranoid 
delusions might have been triggered by such an 
experience.! ... The veracity of the report was 
difficult to gauge, and there was reason to 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e p o r t m i g h t b e 
false.! Nonetheless, the police were justified in 
investigating the reports. [para. 37]
The Search
The warrantless search, however, was a different 
matter. “A search that is conducted for 
the purpose of investigating  crime 
requires a warrant,” said Justice 
Groberman.! “Only where there are 
concerns of a threat to life or personal 
safety will a warrantless entry and 
search be justified.” In this case, the trial 
judge cited reasons for entry related to 
only investigating  a completed crime - 
“to investigate the claim of a home 
invasion and whether or not it had 
occurred” and “to determine if an 
assault had occurred.”
“Without consent, a 
warrantless search is prima 
facie an unreasonable one. 
Where a warrantless search 
is conducted in a person’s 
residence, the Crown has 
the onus of showing that 
the search was lawful.”
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As for safety concerns, the officers did not suggest 
that they suspected that victims of crime remained in 
the house.! Instead, the only people who police 
believed possibly might be in the house were the 
perpetrators of the home invasion. On this point, the 
Court of Appeal stated:
It is difficult to understand how the search could 
have been based on such considerations.!There 
does not appear to be any objective basis for 
their belief that people might remain in the 
premises.!Some two hours had passed between 
the latest possible time for the home invasion 
and the moment the police entered the 
house.![The accused] had not suggested that the 
home invaders had expressed an intent to 
become an occupying force in his home.!Rather, 
he claimed that they were after him personally.
The police did have a suspicion that [the 
accused] had a marihuana grow operation at his 
home, and this might have been a plausible 
motive for people to invade his home.! It is 
entirely unlikely, however, that any invaders 
would have remained in the home for two hours, 
particularly given that [the accused] would have 
had knowledge of their entry into the premises, 
and would have had escaped them.
The unlikelihood of the invaders remaining in 
the home was heightened by the fact that the 
police did not detect any movement, noise, or 
disturbance in the home when they waited 
outside, when they peered in the windows, and 
when they first entered through an unlocked 
door.! The possibility that there were people in 
the home at that point was very remote.! No 
basis for the suspicion that people were holed 
up inside was put forward, other than the fact 
that [the accused] had said that he did not know 
whether the invaders had remained at his 
premises or not.
It is also difficult to articulate what “public safety 
concerns” or “concerns that related to the safety 
of [the accused]” were present.!Even if there was 
some remote possibility that invaders were in the 
house, the police did not, in their testimony, 
suggest any mechanism by which the purported 
home invaders endangered life or personal 
safety.! [The accused] had, by the time police 
entered his home, been admitted to hospital, 
some considerable distance away.!There was no 
possibility that he would be returning  home 
imminently, so there was no immediate risk to 
his personal security.!Police had attended at the 
house, and could easily observe the absence of 
any immediate threat to persons outside of the 
home. [paras. 44-47]
There was no objective support for the police 
officers’ subjective belief that it was necessary to 
enter the home in order to protect the accused or the 
general public. The Crown did not suggest that there 
were grounds for entry into the dwelling  based on 
“exigent circumstances” connected with the 
preservation of evidence or to apprehend criminals, 
such that a warrantless entry under ss.! 529.3(1) or 
529.3(2)(b) of the Criminal Code would be 
authorized. The police could also have interviewed 
the accused after his paranoid symptoms had 
subsided, to determine whether his allegation of a 
home invasion continued to be of concern, or could 
have sought his consent to entry.!The police did not 
consider either of these alternatives to warrantless 
entry. Since the initial search was unlawful, the facts 
gathered by the police in the course of this 
warrantless search were excised from the 
information to obtain and there was no basis on 
which the warrant could properly have been issued. 
The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2), the 
accused’s conviction was overturned, and an 
acquittal was entered. 
A Different View
Justice Smith disagreed with the majority. In her 
view the entry by police without warrant was 
justified. “Prudence dictated that the police not 
ignore [the accused’s] report,” she said. “For the 
police to decide that, because they could see no 
activity from outside the home, there were no public 
safety concerns – by which I mean concerns about 
the safety of people inside the home, including  the 
“A search that is conducted for the purpose 
of investigating crime requires a warrant. 
Only where there are concerns of a threat to 
life or personal safety will a warrantless 
entry and search be justified.”
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alleged assailants – would leave open the risk that 
medical aid would not be made available 
immediately to someone who needed it.! It is 
unrealistic to suggest that the police could have 
sought [the accused’s] consent to entry, given that he 
was suffering  from delusions at the time; or that the 
police could have waited until his delusions had 
subsided.! There was no way of knowing  how long 
[the accused] would have taken to return to 
normalcy, if indeed he was expected to do so.” 
Justice Smith would have dismissed the accused’s 
appeal. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
POLICE MUST WAIT A 
REASONABLE TIME AFTER 
KNOCKING BEFORE ENTRY
R. v. Truong, 2011 BCSC 1483, 
A police officer, with 10 months 
experience, detected an odour of 
v e g e t a t i v e m a r i h u a n a w h i l e 
patrolling. Six days later she attended 
with other, more experienced officers 
and, by walking  the fence lines of properties in the 
area, determined that the odour was coming  from a 
two story house with an attached garage. The police 
obtained a telewarrant under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act to search the residence. Officers 
approached the front door, knocked three times, and 
stated “Police.” When there was no reply, police 
knocked and announced again. An officer said she 
saw a slight movement of the blinds in a window 
next to the door. A battering  ram was then 
immediately used to break open the door and the 
time from the first knock to the use of the battering 
ram was at most 45 seconds. Police entered and 
found more than 500 marihuana plants, fans, lights, 
and other equipment. The accused, who was the sole 
occupant of the home, was arrested upstairs near a 
bathroom and subsequently charged with producing 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking.
!
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court a police 
corporal testified that the movement of the blinds 
indicated that someone was inside and, for reasons 
of officer safety, it was not prudent for police to 
remain standing  outside. He also said he was 
concerned about the general risks inherent in 
marihuana grow operation raids, such as weapons or 
booby traps. In spite of these police concerns, the 
accused alleged, among  other grounds, that his 
rights under s. 8  of the Charter were breached 
because of the manner of police entry. 
Justice Smith agreed. “In the absence of exigent 
circumstances, police executing  a search warrant are 
required to knock first, announce their presence and 
purpose, and allow a reasonable time for any 
occupants to respond,” said the judge. “There could 
be no magic period of time after which forced entry 
is deemed reasonable in all cases and the police are 
not expected to execute a search warrant with a 
stopwatch in hand. What is reasonable will depend 
on the circumstances of each case including  the 
nature of the property and the amount of time an 
occupant might need to come to the door.”
!   
In this case, the judge noted that it was significant 
that this involved a two-story house, which may 
require a longer wait for a response than would a 
smaller home. As for the officer’s safety concerns, he 
noted that the police had “no information to indicate 
any risk associated with this property” nor had they 
“engaged in surveillance prior to executing  the 
warrant.” The judge was also troubled that the 
movement of the blinds was inconsistent with the 
accused being  found upstairs and the fact the officer 
who said she saw the blinds move made no notes 
about it. In finding  a violation of the accused’s rights, 
Justice Smith stated:
!
On all of the evidence, I conclude that the 
police in their eagerness to execute the warrant 
treated the "knock and announce" rule as a 
formality to get out of the way as quickly as 
possible rather than as a sincere attempt to give 
any occupants a reasonable opportunity to 
respond and cooperate. [para. 24]
!
The evidence was excluded and the charges were 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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FINGERPRINT CONSISTENT 
WITH OTHER CONCLUSION:
ATTEMPT B&E OVERTURNED
R. v. Ricketts, 2011 BCCA 402
!
A 41-foot motor vessel moored in a 
public marina was broken into and a 
large tackle box and toolbox were 
stolen.! The vessel was for sale and 
had been cleaned some six weeks 
prior to the break-in. Entry was gained through an 
unlocked sliding  window 
on the starboard side of 
the cabin.! Prints from 
th ree f inge r s o f the 
accused’s left hand were 
lifted from a fixed pane of 
glass on the port-side 
cabin window.!The prints 
formed the impression of 
the accused’s left hand 
being  placed against the 
glass from above and, 
with minor slippage evident, were indicative of his 
having  pressed downward and to the left on the 
glass to some extent.! These were the only prints 
found anywhere on the vessel except for some 
unidentifiable smudged prints on the starboard-side 
window. The accused was charged with breaking 
and entering the vessel and committing theft. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused did not testify. The judge was not satisfied 
the fingerprint evidence proved the accused was the 
person who actually broke into the vessel through 
the starboard-side window and committed the theft, 
but he found the accused had attempted to break in 
and enter the vessel through the port-side cabin 
window.! Although the evidence was entirely 
circumstantial, the judge found there was no other 
rational conclusion. The accused was found guilty of 
the lesser included offence of attempting  to break 
and enter to commit an indictable offence. 
The accused appealed, arguing  that the trial judge’s 
verdict was unreasonable and should be set aside. In 
his view, the evidence went no further than to raise a 
suspicion that he committed the offence. The Crown, 
on the other hand, submitted that the trial judge’s 
verdict was supported by the evidence. 
Justice Lowry, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, found the trial judge’s reasoning  flawed. 
“Once it was determined the evidence does not 
establish (beyond a reasonable doubt) it was the 
[accused] who broke into the vessel, his fingerprints 
establish only that he was on board at some time 
after the cabin structure was cleaned, when any 
fingerprints would have been removed,” said Justice 
Lowry. “I see no evidentiary basis for the conclusion 
that the only rational explanation for the 
[accused] having  applied pressure to the 
fixed pane of the port-side window 
whenever he was on board was, in the 
judge’s words, ‘for the purpose of 
breaking  and entering  the vessel to 
commit an indictable offence therein, i.e. 
theft’.! Clearly, the [accused] was 
trespassing  but it cannot follow from that 
he had to be attempting  to break into the 
vessel when he pressed his hand against 
the window.” The evidence of the 
accused’s fingerprints was at least as consistent with 
his looking  into the cabin from the port side as it is 
with his having  attempted to open the window to 
break in:
His purpose may have been to ascertain whether 
there was anything  in the cabin he might take, 
but even that does not mean he was intending to 
break into the cabin at the time he pressed his 
hand against the fixed pane of the window.! 
Evidence which establishes that at some time the 
[accused] was on the vessel and pressed his 
hand against a part of a cabin window that was 
not even the part that opened, does not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that, at that time, he 
had formed the intention to break into the cabin 
and had actively taken steps to do so.! I do not 
c o n s i d e r i t r e a s o n a b l e t o c o n c l u d e 
otherwise.! The evidence of the [accused’s] 
fingerprints cannot be said to be inconsistent 
with any conclusion other than guilt. [para. 12]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the guilty verdict 
was set aside, and a not guilty verdict was 
substituted. !
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“Once it was determined the 
evidence does not establish ... 
it was the [accused] who broke 
into the vessel, his fingerprints 
establish only that he was on 
board at some time after the 
cabin structure was cleaned.”
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POLICE HAD REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF DRUG ACTIVITY:
ENTRAPMENT NOT PROVEN
R. v. Faqi, 2011 ABCA 284
!
As part of a drug  investigation known 
as Operation Shot Glass, undercover 
police officers would enter bars in 
downtown Calgary. They had no 
particular target in mind but wanted 
to observe who was contributing  to the drug  trade 
within the bar. Having  advance information of drug 
activity in the Melrose Cafe (tips), undercover 
officers entered and approached the accused and his 
friend. Although they had no information the 
accused had been selling  drugs, he and his friend 
were playing  pool and their clothing  stood out. They 
were more casually dressed than the business dress 
of other bar patrons. The officers initiated contact 
with the two men, which led to games of pool as 
well as eating  and drinking  alcohol with them. After 
about an hour, an officer pretended to make a 
telephone call away from the accused and then told 
his fellow undercover officer that he was having 
trouble “getting”. Overhearing  this conversation, the 
accused’s friend offered to get drugs for the officers. 
The officer said he wanted to purchase $100 worth 
of powder cocaine. But the accused’s friend 
unsuccessfully made several calls in an attempt to 
get some. When the officers indicated they would 
accept crack cocaine, the accused! interrupted, 
stating! that he could call “his guy” instead. He 
contacted a drug  dealer who ultimately refused to 
sell the officers anything, suspecting  they were 
police. The accused then volunteered that he could 
remedy the situation. He left the bar, returning 
shortly to pass one of the officers a rock of crack 
cocaine under the table. He received $100 from the 
officer which he then took outside to pay the dealer. 
He was subsequently charged with trafficking  in 
cocaine and possessing proceeds of crime.
!
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the judge found 
the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. However, she granted a stay of proceedings 
because the police had inadequate grounds to 
approach the accused in the bar and had entrapped 
him in doing  so. The police had no reasonable 
suspicion that the accused was already engaged in 
drug  trafficking  and they were not engaged in a bona 
fide inquiry when they bought drugs from him. She 
concluded that the evidence did not support a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
occurring  throughout all of the bars in downtown 
Calgary, even though she held that when police 
entered the bar in question they had reason to 
believe drug  trafficking  may be occurring. 
Alternatively, she found the police went beyond 
providing  an opportunity to commit the offence and 
actually induced its commission through a strategy 
which exploited the bonds of friendship fuelled by 
alcohol.
!
The Crown appealed the stay of proceedings to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal. 
!
Entrapment
!
The defence of entrapment may only be raised after 
the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that an accused committed the crime. A stay of 
proceedings should then only be entered in the 
“clearest of cases,” where the conduct of police 
offends the basic values of community. The 
entrapment defence is available when:
• Police provide a person with an opportunity to 
commit an offence without acting  either on a 
reasonable suspicion that the person is already 
involved in a criminal activity or pursuant to a 
bona fide inquiry; or
• Although having  such a reasonable suspicion or 
acting  in the course of a bona fide inquiry, they 
go beyond providing  an opportunity and 
induce the commission of an offence.
!
A bona fide investigation?
When the police do not have a reasonable suspicion 
about a specific individual involved in a crime, they 
may nonetheless be engaged in a bona fide 
investigation and present an opportunity to commit 
a crime where it is reasonably suspected that certain 
criminal activity is occurring  at a particular location 
or area (which could include a building  or 
premises). In such a case, the police may provide 
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opportunities in a random way to 
people associa ted wi th the 
location under suspicion, even if 
those people are not themselves 
u n d e r s u s p i c i o n . I f t h e 
investigation is not bona fide, the 
actions of the police will amount 
to impermissible random virtue testing  and 
constitute entrapment.  
!
In this case, the Court of Appeal ruled that the trial 
judge “erroneously concluded that the potential 
geographic scope of this inquiry was all the bars in 
downtown Calgary and that the evidence did not 
support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 
was occurring  throughout that large geographic 
area.” The police had the necessary reasonable 
suspicion attaching  to the Melrose Cafe that drug 
trafficking  may be occurring. They were therefore 
acting  in the course of a bona fide investigation. 
“The trial judge made an error of law in failing  to 
appreciate that the scope of the inquiry into whether 
police were engaged in a bona fide investigation 
may be a much smaller area under a widespread 
drug  investigation, and that the bona fide analysis 
should address whether police had reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was occurring  in that 
specific area,” said the Court.
Since the police were engaged in a bona fide 
investigation, it was not necessary for the Court of 
Appeal to determine whether police had a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was drug 
trafficking  prior to the time he was presented with 
the opportunity to sell the drugs.
!
Inducement
Even if the police were acting  within the course of a 
bona fide investigation, entrapment could still be 
established if the police induced the accused to sell 
drugs to them. The trial judge had concluded that 
inducement occurred because the police engaged in 
and exploited the bonds of social friendship, fuelled 
by alcohol and food, during  the hours they spent 
with the accused in the bar. After considering  a 
number of factors, the Court of Appeal disagreed 
and found the police did not induce the commission 
of an offence as suggested by the trial judge. Instead, 
the Court noted the accused 
volunteered to commit the crime, 
having  overheard a conversation in 
which the undercover officers 
indicated an interest in buying 
cocaine from his friend:
  
[D]rug trafficking  is notoriously difficult to detect 
without some aspect of undercover involvement. 
Further, the police did not make any request of 
[the accused] whatsoever; their interest and 
communication relating to the drug sale was 
di rected to his f r iend. [The accused] 
spontaneously interposed himself into the 
transaction. No reward was offered to him. Any 
concrete benefit to him would, conceivably, 
come only by way of commission paid to him by 
the drug  trafficker for acting as a middle-man. 
No threats were made and no illegal action was 
taken by the police. [para. 25]
!
The police conduct in this case was not entrapment 
and undercover officers did not induce the accused 
to commit the crime of drug  trafficking. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was 
lifted, convictions for cocaine trafficking  and 
proceeds of crime were entered, and the matter was 
remitted back to the trial judge for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
!
“[D]rug trafficking is 
notoriously difficult to 
detect without some aspect 
of undercover involvement.” !
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Entrapment
“Entrapment recognizes that there are 
limits on what the police can do in the 
suppression of criminal activity.  Those 
limits reflect community standards of 
fairness and decency.  When a court gives effect to an 
entrapment claim and stays a proceeding, it refuses to 
condone state conduct that runs contrary to those 
community standards.  It does so by refusing to lend its 
processes to the prosecution of those who are ensnared 
by the offensive state conduct” - Ontario Court of Appeal 
Justice Doherty, R. v. Ahluwalia, (2000) 139 OAC 154.  
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APPLY NOW – Applications are now being 
accepted for the May 2012 Cohort.
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